It would however, be a mistake to confine discussion of the legitimacy of the judicial role under the HRA to the reaches of sections 3(1) and 4 alone, since section 2(1) also allows the court a significant margin of discretion. Although the overt purpose of the Act is to ‗give further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights', domestic courts are neither bound to strictly ‗follow' or ‗apply' the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 13 Under section 2(1) of the Act, courts and tribunals have a duty to ‗take into account' the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg institutions in adjudication under the Act: a duty which, prima facie, does not appear to guarantee adherence to that case-law in practice, ‗since it is open to the judiciary to consider, but disapply a particular decision.' 14 The courts'
duty, under section 6(1) and 6(3)(a), to act compatibly, ensures that a direct conflict with the principles of the Convention rights themselves is unlikely to result from a decision under the Act; to provide a protection below the minimum standard afforded by Strasbourg would be an apparent contravention of those provisions. But it is this duty, to only ‗take into account' the Convention case-law, coupled with the nature of that jurisprudence, that brings a new perspective to the idea of maintaining legitimacy in judicial decision-making. 
16
In terms of the construction of s.2(1) the courts' obligation would appear to be satisfied by simply considering the Strasbourg authority put before it; having taken the decision into account it would not be obliged to follow or apply its reasoning. The courts will often be faced with cases that involve factors perhaps specific to the United Kingdom which distinguish them from cases considered by the European Court … it is important that our courts have the scope to apply that discretion so as to aid the development of human rights law.
30
The Parliamentary debates give few hints as to the specific circumstances in which a domestic court might legitimately depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence; but for determining the question of whether a purposive approach to the Convention rights under the Act was envisaged, the very fact that domestic courts are not bound to follow or apply the Strasbourg jurisprudence seems to point towards a positive answer. In his commentary on the movement away from the ‗austerity of tabulated legalism' in the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee, Ewing has written of the decision in
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher:
Lord Wilberforce thought it was appropriate to point out that the Privy Council was ‗concerned with a Constitution' which had ‗certain special characteristics' which included the fact that it was ‗drafted in a broad and ample style' and was 
C. Using Strasbourg as a template for a domestic human rights jurisprudence
This tension is exacerbated by the fact that the Convention and its jurisprudence demand of the domestic judiciary a more creative intervention than that required by the application of a statutory provision to a given set of circumstances. The deficiencies of the Convention and its case-law as a basis of a domestic human rights jurisprudence are threefold: firstly there is the relative weakness of the Convention itself as a statement of positive rights; secondly there is a tendency towards paucity in the Convention jurisprudence in respect of actually defining the content of the rights it protects; finally, there is the application of the margin of appreciation.
As to the first of these limitations, it is the structure of the Convention itself, and the exceptions to the rights provided, which provides a hindrance to its direct application 
12
It is well known that the terms of the Convention are extremely vague, with most freedoms enjoying only qualified protection and with much depending on such vague phrases as ‗necessary in a democratic society', ‗pressing social need' and proportionality. 47 As to the condition that a restriction be ‗necessary in a democratic society,' the European This is not to say that the domestic judiciary cannot gain any enlightenment through recourse to such decisions -simply that the margin of appreciation is a further factor to be ‗taken into account' when determining the degree of reliance to be placed upon a judgment or opinion by a domestic court in coming to its decision.
D. Strasbourg 'precedent' and principle
54 And should also note that the margin of appreciation may not only vary as between subject matter but also as between the justification relied upon for the restriction of a right: Sunday Times v United Kingdom Whilst the above suggests that there are a number of factors to be taken into account in considering the relevance of a given Strasbourg decision or decisions -and hint at the potential for a more expansive domestic interpretation of the Convention rightsdomestic courts, in particular the House of Lords, have approached section 2(1) in a curious manner, treating ‗relevant' Strasbourg jurisprudence as tantamount to binding, rather than guiding or persuasive authority, as the obligation to ‗take into account' seems to suggest. 57 As Lord Slynn suggested in Alconbury:
Although the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide that a national court is bound by these decisions it is obliged to take account of them so far as they are relevant. In the absence of special circumstances it seems to me that the court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. If it does not do so there is at least a possibility that the case will go to that court which is likely in the ordinary case to follow its own constant jurisprudence. … the problem is that judges or Governments may be tempted to point to such minimum standards as evidence of the limits of the human rights at stake. The challenge is to ensure that national courts treat the international human rights as a part of the national heritage and interpret them in the national context so as to
give the appropriate maximum protection at the national level … It is important that national courts have the autonomy to interpret the relevant international human rights so as to make them appropriate to the national culture. The relationship between the rights conferred under the HRA and fundamental common law rights is something of an ambiguity which is yet to be clarified. It seems as if constitutional rights are not to be simply subsumed into the developing domestic jurisprudence concerning the ‗Convention rights' as defined in section 1(1) of the HRA.
The above dicta of Laws LJ suggests that the HRA has given a sense of democratic legitimacy to the common law of fundamental rights. And as Sedley LJ has said of the development of the common law in relation to the legal protection of personal privacy, Campbell. 98 In that case, Lord Nicholls noted that the post-HRA development of the doctrine of confidence was such that the action could now more accurately be termed ‗misuse of private information', reflecting the fact that the law no longer required an existing confidential relationship nor was it limited to protecting information which might strictly be called ‗confidential.' 
